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Abstract 
 In this paper we examine how increases in intertemporal price uncertainty affect the 
welfare of a consumer. In the preference structure of the consumer the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) are parametrically independent. We 
find that under empirically plausible circumstances, for each given degree of risk aversion an 
increase in price uncertainty reduces consumer welfare if the EIS is lower than a corresponding 
threshold value. Overall our results suggest that for parameter estimates found in much of the 
empirical literature, increases in intertemporal price uncertainty are likely to reduce consumer 
welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The notion that increased price uncertainty reduces consumer welfare does not always find 
support from economic models. In particular, analyses that focus on static settings often suggest 
that price uncertainty is likely to enhance consumer welfare. Waugh (1944) showed that price 
instability always implies higher expected consumer surplus than that implied by price 
stabilization. Turnovsky et al (1980) demonstrated that price instability does not always entail 
higher expected utility but most likely does. Baye (1985) showed that if a population of 
individuals has a range of preferences that includes the entire set of neoclassical preferences, then 
price stabilization makes at least one individual worse off. The intuition reflected in the static 
results cited above is that price instability brings with it both a risk (prices overall will be 
sufficiently high for lower utility) and an opportunity (prices overall will be sufficiently low for 
higher utility). Taking preferences, probabilities, and the quasi-convexity of the indirect utility 
function in the price vector into consideration, the opportunity may well outweigh the risk.  
  Situated in an intertemporal setting, the analysis of the present paper indicates that the 
static analysis must be supplemented. Increased price uncertainty reduces consumer welfare over 
a broader range of cases than the static results intuitively would suggest. The additional results in 
a dynamic setting derive from two, related aspects of our analysis. First, past actions are 
irreversible. This introduces a type of constraint on intertemporal substitution among consumption 
goods (i.e. on choice of the consumption vector) that has no analogue in the static setting (where 
the entire vector of consumption goods is chosen simultaneously).   
 Second is our treatment of preferences. We employ a tractable model of preferences, 
adopted from Weil (1990), (see also Epstein and Zin (1989)), in which risk aversion and 
intertemporal substitution are parametrically disentangled. Intuitively, as is discussed later in the 
paper, these factors play distinct roles in determining the impact of price uncertainty on consumer 
welfare. Hence, a choice-theoretic framework allowing separation of these factors is of interest.1 
                                               
1
 The preference specification employed here emerges from an alternative theoretical direction in the paper of 
Maenhout (1999). He shows that an economic agent who has a CRRA utility function and a preference for  
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(Compare the standard time-separable, constant relative risk aversion framework, in which the 
CRRA coefficient measures both the consumer's attitude toward risk and the inverse of the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution.) Consideration of a more general preference structure is 
also supported by the empirical studies of Epstein and Zin (1991) and Giovannini and Weil 
(1989), in both of which the time-separable expected-utility representation is rejected.  
 In line with the preceding discussion, our results involve a set of pivotal conditions -- 
conditions ensuring curvature properties of a key function in our representation of preferences -- 
in which the degree of risk aversion and the willingness to substitute intertemporally enter 
independently. An example of the (generally intuitive) implications flowing from these conditions 
is the following. Provided that the degree of risk aversion is above a certain cutoff, for any given 
degree of risk aversion, the lower is a consumer’s elasticity of intertemporal substitution the more 
likely she is to be worse off in the face of a multi-period increase in price uncertainty. We discuss 
this and other implications in the body of the paper. We also review some of the empirical work 
on risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. Overall, our results suggest that for a range of 
parameter values consistent with much of the empirical literature, increased price uncertainty in an 
intertemporal setting reduces consumer welfare.  
 Section 2 below presents the general model. Analysis and results are provided in Section 
3, and Section 4 presents two numerical examples. Section 5 provides a brief discussion of related 
empirical literature. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Model   
 We consider an individual who has a finite horizon of N periods or an infinite horizon, 
who consumes one type of good, and who faces an uncertain price for that good in every period 
(except the first period). The consumer begins with a given level of wealth. There are no 
                                                                                                                                                       
“robustness” may behave as if she has the preference structure assumed in the present paper. Robustness is, loosely, 
a characteristic of the mode of decision-making in circumstances of model uncertainty such that a satisfactory 
outcome is attained in the worst-case scenario. For more discussion of the concept of robustness, see Anderson, 
Hansen, and Sargent (2000). 
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borrowing or lending opportunities. We also assume that this individual has no productive 
opportunities. Thus, we are isolating the problem of price uncertainty from those of interest rate 
and income uncertainty. 
Consistent with our earlier discussion, we assume a generalized preference structure with 
a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion and a constant, parametrically independent elasticity 
of intertemporal substitution. Following Weil (1990), the resulting recursive relationship 
representing this individual's preference ordering is written   
 
(1) Vk(Ak,pk) = max U[ck, EkVk+1(Ak+1, p k1* )]  
 
      {(1- E)(ck)1-U  +  E [1+(1-E )(1- J)EkVk+1(Ak+1, p k1*  )](1-U )/(1- J )}(1- J )/(1- U)    1     
          =   max   ______________________________________________________________. 
          (1- E)(1- J) 
 
  In (1), Ak is wealth at the beginning of period k and pk is the price in period k, (where no 
confusion results, the subscripts are dropped); Ak+1  [0,Ak] is wealth at the beginning of the 
(k+1)st period, optimally chosen in period k, and ck [0,Ak/pk] is optimal consumption in the kth 
period, with of course pkck+Ak+1 = Ak. Vk is the value function, mapping the period-k (wealth, 
price) ordered pair into expected benefit over the remaining periods. The function U is an 
"aggregator function", (Weil (1990), p.31), the structure of which, (in (1) above), implements the 
generalization of the usual isoelastic preference structure with expected-utility representation. The 
notation “ * ” denotes a random variable, (this notation is sometimes dropped in the sequel; no 
confusion should result), E is the (unconditional) expectation operator, Ek is the expectation 
conditional on pk, and E (0,1),  U>0, Uz1, and  J>0,  Jz1 are parameters.2  
 J measures relative risk aversion, (see (2) below). For deterministic time paths, 1/U 
measures the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, (in (1), drop the expectation operator and by 
means of sequential substitution derive an expression involving successive consumption levels). 
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Where time paths are random, this elasticity is not well-defined. Nonetheless, (see Hall(1988), for 
example), 1 / U  still provides an indication of attitude toward intertemporal fluctuations per se in 
consumption that can constitute another source, in addition to relative risk aversion, of the 
adverse effect price uncertainty can have on consumer welfare in an intertemporal setting. The 
degree to which it represents a potential source of adverse effects on welfare is heightened under 
uncertainty by the fact that past actions are irreversible, a point emphasized in the introduction.  
 Prices are independent continuous random variables defined on the finite interval [a,b]. 
Initially prices are identically distributed across periods. We introduce increases in uncertainty, 
affecting the current and future choices of a consumer and her expected well-being, by means of 
mean preserving spreads of the distributions of one or more prices.  
 
3.a. Finite horizon 
 We consider first the N-period case, where Nt 2  and finite. By induction (the proof 
making use of the maximization just below), one can show that for any k { ,..., }1 1N , Vk can 
be written 
(2) V A p A pk k k k k k( , )
( ) ( )
( )( ) 
 
 

 1 1
1 1
1
1 1E I
E J
J
U J
,                                             
where I k kp( )  plays the role of a scaling function of the value of the asset, and is positive. For k 
= N, the value function is also given by (2), with IN  taking the simple form I JN p p( )  1 . 
Beginning with IN , approximate forms for the functions I k  can be derived sequentially, if model 
parameters and distributions for the prices are specified. However, here we shall be interested 
simply in an equation that characterizes I k .  
                                                                                                                                                       
2
 A suitable limiting treatment yields forms for the value functions for the cases of U=1 and J=1. For simplicity we 
ignore these boundary cases in the development below. Results follow essentially the same pattern as that below but  
require changes in details because of the differing forms of the value functions. 
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 We introduce the variable pk , a function of the expectation of the scaling function 
I k kp( ) , through the definition p E pk k k 

[ ( )]*I
U
J
1
1
 for k{2,...,N}, where the expectation is 
with respect to the distribution of p k
*
. The value function Vk can then be written 
                                          {( )(1 1  E A Ak k ) 1}pA)1(p 1
1
1k
1
1k
1
k
1 EE U
J

U

UU
  
(3) Vk(Ak,pk) = max  _______________________________________________     
                               Ak+1                                    (1-E)(1-J) 
 
for k{1,...,N-1}. (For k = N, recall that the value function is given by (2) with I JN p p( )  1 .) In 
(3), 1kp E  plays the role of a discount factor for the value of next period's initial asset level. The 
impact of price uncertainty is reflected in 1kp  . An increase in 1kp   raises the value of the asset 
next period. With extraneous terms deleted, the first-order condition is 
 
(4)     

 



( )A A p A pk k k k k1 1 1 1 0U U UE . 
 
It is straightforward to check that the second-order condition for a maximum holds and that in 
fact the (interior) solution to (4) yields a global maximum. From (4) one can derive expressions 
for Ak+1 and Ak-Ak+1. Substituting into (3) and going through some tedious but straightforward 
algebra, one has the following:  
 
                                  1}pp{A)1( 1
)1(1
1k
11
k
1
k
1
1
EE U
JU
U

UU
U
JU
J
   
(5) Vk(Ak,pk) =     ____________________________________.                                                               
                                                               (1-E)(1-J)  
 
Therefore we have the recursive form for the function kI : 
 
(6) I E
U
U U U
U J
U
k k k kp p p( ) { }
( )
 




1 1
1
1 1
1
, where J
U

I 1
1
*
1k1k )]p(E[p  
 
for k = 1,...,N-1, (the expression for IN Np( )  is given above) . 
 For the optimization problem specified here, the pair (Ak,pk) is given, and the prices  pk+1, 
...,pN are continuous random variables, where k takes any value in {1,...,N-1}. (Hence, in all cases 
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( , )A p1 1  is nonrandom.) As indicated earlier, these prices are independently distributed with finite 
support [a,b] in 

. They are taken as initially identically distributed with distribution function 
F. When a price has the distribution function F we shall say that the price has “the initial 
distribution.”  
 For any period k = 2,...,N, we use the notation “^” to indicate that the value p pk k   is 
the value of  pk  defined when the prices pk ,..., pN are iid with the initial distribution. This same 
notation in the expression I k , k=1,...,N, indicates that this function is defined by (6) with 
p pk k  1 1 . 
 Increases in uncertainty are introduced by means of independent mean preserving spreads 
(mps’s) in the distributions of one or more prices, with the initial distribution maintained for the 
remaining prices. The mps’s for different prices need not be the same. We identify three different 
types of increase in uncertainty. The first type is that in which there is an mps for pN only. The 
second type is that in which an mps occurs for some single price other than pN. In the final type, 
the increase in uncertainty takes the form of mps’s for two or more of the prices.3 
 We make use of the following lemmas in the sequel. 
 
Lemma 1. For k=2,...,N-1, pk  is monotonically increasing in pk1 . 
 
Proof. The proof makes use of the definition of pk , the expression for I k  in equation (6), and a 
case-by-case approach with cases defined by combinations of U >1 or  <1 and J >1 or <1. The 
arguments are analogous across cases, so we restrict attention to just one combination of values, 
U <1 and J >1. 
 Using (6) and the definition of pk , we have 
(7) p E p pk k k 





{ [ ] }
( )U
U U U
U J
U
U
JE
1 1
1
1 1
1
1
1
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where the expectation is with respect to the distribution of pk. (This distribution remains fixed 
when pk1  changes.) Suppose that pk1  increases. Then the expression in square brackets 
increases. Since 1 0 !U  and 1 0 J , the expectation decreases and pk  increases.// 
 
 To avoid repetition, we note here that generally applications of Lemma 1 in the sequel 
involve a trivial induction. The goal in each case is to show that an increase (decrease) in pk r  
implies an increase (decrease) in pk q  for some r>q. 
 
Lemma 2. Suppose that N2 p,...,p  are iid. Then for k = 2,...,N-1, p pk k! 1 . 
 
Proof. The proof is by induction. (Implicitly, the proof here covers the four cases defined in the 
proof of Lemma 1.) Consider first k = N-1. Using the definition of pN1  and pN  in terms of IN1  
and IN , respectively, and making use of equation (7), we obtain 
 
J
U
U
JU
UUU
U

E 1
1
1
)1(1
N
11
1N1N }]pp[E{p                                                       
 > N
1
1
1
N
1
1
1
)1(1
N p}Ep{}]p[E{   J
U
JJ
U
U
JU
U
U
. 
 
 Note that in the term after the inequality, we have substituted pN for pN-1. Only the 
notation differs here; the two variables both represent the iid price random variable that is 
assumed in the present lemma.  
                                                                                                                                                       
3
 We could articulate this taxonomy so that the three types of increase in uncertainty are nested. The way in which 
we have chosen to distinguish the types simplifies the formal exposition. 
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 Turning now to the general case, for purposes of the formal proof, switch to subscript j, j 
= 4,...,N, and suppose that p pj j !1 . Then we need to show that p pj j !2 1 . The proof is simply 
the following: 
 
J
U
U
JU
U

UU
U

E 1
1
1
)1(1
1j
11
2j2j }]pp[E{p                                                                                                 
           1j
1
1
1
)1(1
j
11
1j p}]pp[E{ J
U
U
JU
UUU
U

 E!  .  // 
   
 That the sequence of the pk  is decreasing is consistent with our interpretation of Epk  as 
the discount scalar for the value of the initial asset level in period k. In period k there is one more 
period left compared with period k+1. Hence the discount factor for asset-holding at the outset of 
period k is larger than its counterpart for period k+1, Epk1 . 
For an increase in price uncertainty in the last period of life we have the following result. 
 
Proposition 1. Suppose that there is an mps for pN . Then for any given k N { ,..., }1 1  and 
corresponding realization (Ak,pk): 
 (a) If J  2 , Vk(Ak,pk) increases. 
 (b) If J  2 , Vk(Ak,pk) is unchanged. 
 (c) If J ! 2 , Vk(Ak,pk) decreases. 
 
Proof. The cases (a)-(c) are broken down into subcases according to the specified range of values 
for U . Demonstrations for all subcases are very similar, so we restrict attention to J ! 2  and 
U  1 . 
 From J ! 2 , p N
J 1
 is strictly convex, so that an mps implies that E p N
J 1
 increases.4 This, 
together with 0)1/()1( JU , implies that pN  decreases. Using Lemma 1, it is then easy to see 
                                               
4
 That the expectation of a strictly convex (strictly concave) function increases (decreases) with an mps follows 
from the equivalence results in the paper by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). 
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that pk  decreases for all k. This and 0)1/()1( UJ  imply that the numerator in (5) increases 
for any k. Since 1 0 J , Vk(Ak,pk) decreases.// 
 
By way of expansion on the statement of results in Proposition 1, suppose that there is an 
mps in period N. Then if the consumer finds herself in some period k { ,..., }1 1N , with some 
realization (Ak,pk), she is unaffected by the increase in uncertainty if J  2 ; she is better off 
(worse off) than she would have been in that period, with that realization, if J  2 ( J ! 2) . 
Intuitively, this result can be understood by noting that the agent consumes everything in 
the last period of life regardless of the last period price. When the price in the last period of life is 
observed the agent cannot reverse the decision she made in the previous period and there are no 
future periods for which to plan. For this reason the welfare effect of price uncertainty only 
depends on the risk aversion parameter. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution plays no role.  
We focus briefly on the different effect of price instability in a static multi-good setting as 
opposed to a dynamic multi-period setting. In both the multi-good and multi-period models, price 
instability creates opportunity but also risk for consumers. Under certain circumstances the benefit 
of the opportunity outweighs the risk. Intuitively price instability in a static multi-good model 
tends to be more favorable to consumers than that in a comparable multi-period model.  This is 
because in the static multi-good model, consumption for all goods is decided after the realization 
of prices, whereas in a multi-period model, consumption of some goods is chosen before the 
realization of uncertain future prices. In comparison, different goods are better intratemporal 
substitutes in the static setting than they are intertemporal substitutes in the dynamic setting, and 
the demands for the goods with uncertain prices are more elastic in the static multi-good setting. 
We can support this intuition by comparing the following two-good model with the two-period 
model. In the two-good model, the price of good one is fixed at 1; the price of good 2, p, is 
uncertain.  Consumption decisions for both goods are made after p is observed.   
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 Suppose the utility function is of the constant relative risk aversion type. The consumer's 
indirect utility function, (defined in terms of the relative price p), is W(A,p) = max 
)1/()1c()1/()1c( 1211 JEJ JJ , where the budget constraint is Apcc 21   . We are 
interested in the condition under which the second order partial derivative with respect to price is 
greater than 0. One can easily verify that 22 p/W ww >0 at the mean price p=1 if and only if 
JEJJ /1)2( . If 1 E  then the threshold level such that the consumer benefits (suffers) from 
the instability in p is defined by J  smaller (larger) than 2.414.  If 1E then the threshold is even 
larger. Recall that Proposition 1 states that in a corresponding two-period model, when 2 J  the 
consumer is indifferent to instability in the second period price. This example suggests that price 
instability in multi-period settings is less favorable than price instability in static multi-good 
settings.   
The size of J  in relation to the benchmark value of 2 and the curvature of 
I JN p p( )  1 are key elements in the statement and proof of Proposition 1. When we turn to the 
two other types of increase in uncertainty, the situation is similar. Here is the main result for the 
case of an mps for a single price other than pN.  
 Consider the function  
(8)   U
U
U

U

EJU [
11
2k
1
1k ppˆ)2()p( . 
 
Proposition 2 shows that the sign of the function [ k1 determines the welfare effect of an mps for 
p k1
*
 for some single k N { ,..., }1 2 . 
 
Proposition 2. If 0)p(1k [   on (a,b), then for any j = 1,...,k and corresponding realization 
(Aj,pj), Vj(Aj,pj) increases. If [ k p !1 0( )  on (a,b), then for any such j, Vj(Aj,pj) decreases. 
 
Proof. Begin with I k kp 1 1( )  defined as in (6). The second derivative with respect to pk+1 is 
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U



U
JU
U

UU
U

UUEUJUUJU I
2
1k
2
2
1
)1(1
2k
11
1k1k
"
1k p]/)1[(}pp]{1)1/()1()][1/()1([)p(
 
   
11
1k
1
1
)1(
1
2k
11
1k p)/1](/)1[(}pp)]{1/()1([

U



U
JU
U

UU
U

UUUEUJU . 
 
This expression is <0 (>0) on (a,b) as 
U
U

U

UU
U

EUJUUUJUJ
1
1k
1
2k
11
1k p}pp){/1)(1(]/)1][(1)1/()1()[1(  <0 (>0) on (a,b). 
 We have, after some further manipulation, that this is equivalent to ( ) ( )J [
 
1 1 1k kp <0 
(>0) on (a,b). It follows that I k kp 1 1( )  is strictly concave (strictly convex) on [a,b] as 
( ) ( )J [ 
 
1 01 1k kp  (! 0)  on (a,b). From the recursive structure in the current setting, it follows 
that the mps for p k1
*
 does not affect pk2 . Hence, p pk k  2 2  in the definition of [ k1 , and also 
I k1  is the function I k1 . 
 As with Proposition 1, there are a number of subcases. Here, the subcases are defined by 
the size of J , the size of U , and the sign of [ k kp 1 1( )  on (a,b). Again, as with Proposition 1, 
demonstrations for the various subcases are similar. We therefore restrict attention to a single 
subcase. We take J ! 2 , U  1 , and [ k kp  !1 1 0( ) , (for which J ! 2  is a necessary condition). 
 For this subcase,  ( )I k kp 1 1 is strictly convex in pk+1. Then E pk k ( )*I  1 1  increases with the 
mps for p k1
*
 . With 0)1/()1( JU , it follows that pk1  falls with the mps. Consequently, from 
(6), for any given pk, I k kp( ) increases since 0)1/()1( UJ . Finally, the fact that 1 0 J  
implies that for any realization (Ak,pk), V A pk k k( , )  decreases with the mps. 
 If k>1, take any j = 1,...,k-1. Since pk1  decreases, Lemma 1 implies that p j1  falls for any 
j. (Note that the random variables p j1* , j =1,...,k-1, remain iid with the initial distribution.) Then 
as above, for any given p j , I j jp( )  increases, and for any realization ( , )A pj j , V A pj j j( , )  
decreases with the mps.// 
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The intuition for this result dovetails with that for Proposition 1. As is noted earlier in the 
discussion following Proposition 1, when there is an increase in price uncertainty in the last 
period, the agent is unable to change consumption decisions made in the past and there are no 
future periods, so the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) does not affect the condition 
under which the increase in price uncertainty increases or reduces consumer welfare. 
Alternatively, consider the effect of a one-time increase in price uncertainty in period k+1 when 
there are one or more periods left in the agent's life. The agent can make changes in (ex ante plans 
for) future consumption after observing the price for period k+1. The welfare implication of this 
option depends on the EIS. The role of the EIS depends on the number of periods the agent has 
left after the increase in price uncertainty is resolved.  
From Proposition 2, an increase in uncertainty in the period k+1 price makes the consumer 
worse off if U
U
U

UE!JU
11
2k
1
ppˆ)2(  for p a b( , )  and better off with the reverse inequality. Note 
that under the condition 2 J , which according to Proposition 1 makes the consumer indifferent 
to price uncertainty in the last period, the consumer’s welfare is increased when there are more 
periods left in her life after the realization of increased price uncertainty.  
 More generally, the inequality above suggests the question: How do the coefficient of risk 
aversion J and EIS 1/U determine the welfare effect of an increase in price uncertainty? Intuitively, 
increased price uncertainty should be welfare reducing if the consumer is risk averse (J is large) or 
reluctant to substitute consumption intertemporally (U is large). So for a larger J the threshold 
value of U, (that is, the value at which [ k p  1 0( )  holds for some p and beyond which 
[ k p !1 0( )  on (a,b)), should be smaller. It turns out that this intuition is not always correct. To 
see why, let J be fixed at a value above 2, and the current price p be set at 1. There are two 
scenarios to be considered.  
 If tE
2kpˆ 1, then as U becomes larger the inequality is more likely to hold. This supports 
the intuition in the preceding paragraph: when the EIS (1/ U ) is smaller the consumer is more 
likely to be hurt by increased price uncertainty. Another useful insight the above inequality reveals 
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is the following. According to Lemma 2, kp  is decreasing in k. Therefore if k is larger (that is, 
when the increase in price uncertainty occurs later) the inequality is more likely to hold, i.e., the 
consumer is more likely to be hurt by increased price uncertainty. This is because when there are 
fewer periods left in the consumer's life after the (now increased) price uncertainty is resolved the 
consumer's ability to respond is more limited. A practical implication is that in an economy with 
agents of different ages, old agents' welfare is more likely to be adversely affected by price 
uncertainty than that of young agents.  
Because 2kpˆ   is decreasing in k, the greater the number of periods that remain after an 
increase in uncertainty, the more likely it is that tE
2kpˆ 1 holds, implying that increases in U  
make it more likely that the consumer is worse off, in accord with intuition. On the other hand, 
more periods remaining after the increase in uncertainty implies that for a given U , it is more 
likely that the consumer is better off (Epk2  is larger), again in accord with intuition.   
The alternative case is that of 2kpˆ E <1. There are two possible subcases. If U is large, then 
the sign of the function [ k1  is mainly determined by the size of the term )2( JU . The larger is 
the value of J, the smaller is the threshold value of U. The role of U  and that of the size of k are 
the same in this subcase as in the case discussed above.  
On other hand if U is small then the sign of [ k1  is determined by how close U is to 0. This 
is because as Uo0, U

E /12k )pˆ( converges to 0 faster than U does.5 It follows that [ k p1 ( )  is 
positive when U is sufficiently small, i.e., for a given value of the risk aversion parameter, an 
increase in price uncertainty is more likely to make the consumer worse off when she has a larger 
EIS. This implication is counter-intuitive. Because one would expect that with a larger EIS there 
is more flexibility in allocating consumption intertemporally, the opportunity aspect of fluctuations 
in prices should offer higher benefit and the consumer should be more likely to be made better off 
                                               
5
  This statement holds true taking into account the fact that 2kpˆ   also depends on U.  
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by increased price uncertainty. The apparent puzzle can be explained when we analyze more 
closely the benefit of price fluctuations in this case. When the EIS is large and the parameter E is 
small, the consumer finds it is optimal to consume early. Imagine that it is optimal to consume 
most of her resources in the first period of life, before realization of any price uncertainty. The 
"front loading" of the consumption profile means that after the realization of price uncertainty 
there is not much wealth left to consume. When the uncertain price turns out to be low the 
consumer's gain is limited by her lack of resources. When the consumer consumes her resources 
early due to a low E  together with an already large EIS, a larger EIS (i.e., smaller U) leads to 
further front-loading. This effect can offset the benefit of intertemporal flexibility and result in a 
net reduction in welfare. In Section 4, we further illustrate this explanation with a numerical 
example. The example also suggests that the first, more intuitive subcase is the one consistent 
with conventional estimates of  the EIS. 
 We have a corollary to Proposition 2. Consider the following conditions:  
  U J E U U
U
U( )  

2
1 1 1
p aN   for  U  1  
(9) 
  U J E U U
U
U( )  

2
1 1 1
p bN   for  U ! 1 , 
and 
  
U
U
UUE!JU
11
2
1
bpˆ)2(   for  U  1  
(10) 
  
U
U
UUE!JU
11
2
1
apˆ)2(   for  U ! 1 . 
 
Corollary. Suppose that there is an mps for a price p k1* , for some single k N { ,..., }1 2 . Then 
for any j = 1,...,k, and corresponding realization ( , )A pj j , V A pj j j( , )  increases if (9) holds, 
decreases if (10) holds. 
 
Proof. From Lemma 2, 22kN pˆpˆpˆ d  . It follows that condition (9) implies [ k p 1 0( )  for p = 
a, (if U  1), and for p = b, (if U ! 1). Similarly, condition (10) implies [ k p !1 0( )  for p = b, (if 
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U  1), and for p = a, (if U ! 1). Because all values of p lie in [a,b], this means that [ k p 1 0( )  
on [a,b] if  condition (9) holds and [ k p !1 0( )  on [a,b] if condition (10) holds. The results for Vj  
then follow from Proposition 2.// 
 
 Conditions (9) and (10) are more restrictive than analogous conditions involving the 
function [ k1  defined in (8). The main significance of the corollary is that the conditions (9) and 
(10) are independent of the timing, in addition to the other characteristics, of the particular mps 
being considered. 
 Suppose now the third type of increase in uncertainty: independent mps’s for two or more 
prices. Let h+1 denote the earliest period in which there is an mps, for p h1
*
, where h takes some 
value in {1,...,N-2}. If the mps for p h1*  were the only mps, then we would be in the context of 
Proposition 2. In that context, the post-mps value of ph2  is ph2  and the post-mps function I h1  
is I h1 . This configuration reflects the fact that there is no increase in uncertainty beyond that in 
period h+1. 
 In the current context, the post-mps value of ph2 , denote it ph
r
2 , is not equal to ph2 . 
(In the present discussion and in Proposition 3, the superscript “r” denotes post-mps values and 
functions.) This is because there is at least one period k ht  2  in which there is an mps for p k* . 
That is, ph
r
2 differs from the initial value ph2  because of a change directly in the distribution of 
p h2
*
 due to an mps and/or because there is an mps for some k>h+2, the latter then affecting the 
value of ph2  through the recursive relation (7), (or equivalently, through recursive application of 
the definition of pk  with I k  determined in (6), k ht  2 ). The value ph2  phr 2 , and hence also 
the post-mps function I Ih h
r
 
 1 1 , thus depend on the entire set of mps’s other than that for p h1
*
. 
They reflect that part of the increase in uncertainty represented by the set of mps’s for periods 
k ht  2 . The dichotomy here between the increase in uncertainty in period h+1 and that in some 
periods k later than h+1 arises because period h+1 marks the boundary between periods where 
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there is no increase in uncertainty (k=1,...,h) and periods in some of which an increase in 
uncertainty occurs (the boundary period h+1 and some of the periods k ht  2 ). 
 In light of the dichotomy just noted, a similarity here to the case of a single mps is the 
pivotal role played by I h
r
1 , with the additional element now of how this function is related to 
I h1 . The curvature of I h1  is still important and so the function [ h p1 ( )  defined in (8), (with the 
subscript h replacing k), is important. We have the following result. 
 
Proposition 3. Suppose that there is a set of independent mps’s, not necessarily the same, for 
two or more prices p k1
*
, where k N { ,..., }1 1 . Let h+1 denote the earliest period in which 
there is an mps, and h+M the last period in which there is an mps, where h takes some value in 
{1,...,N-2}, M some value in {2,...,N-h}. If [ h p !1 0( )  on (a,b), then for any  j=1,...,h+M-1 
V A p V A pj
r
j( , ) ( , )  for any A>0 and p a b[ , ]  (here, Vj  is the initial, pre-mps value function 
for period j). That is, for any such j and corresponding realization ( , )A pj j , the consumer is 
worse off. 
  
Proof. The proofs for the cases of U  1  and U ! 1  are very similar, so we present in detail only 
the proof for U  1 .  
 The strategy of the proof is this. First we show that p ph k
r
h k 

 for k=1,...,M. Then we 
use p ph
r
h 1 1

 to show that p pjr j   for j=2,...,h. Finally, from these results we obtain the desired 
conclusion regarding the value functions. It should perhaps be noted that there is some 
redundancy of implications in the proof, but we proceed as we do for the sake of a unified logical 
pattern. 
 We show by induction that p ph k
r
h k 

 on the set K M { ,..., }1 , (note that for some 
elements k K , there may not be an mps for p h k
* ). If M=N-h, so that p ph M N  * * , then the strict 
convexity of IN , (implied by J ! 2 , which is in turn implied by [ h p !1 0( ) ), along with U  1  
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and J ! 2 , imply that the mps for pN
*
 leads to p p p ph M
r
N
r
N h M    
 
. Alternatively, suppose 
that M<N-h. Then using the definition of M and, as in Proposition 2, the recursive structure in the 
current setting, we have p ph M
r
h M    1 1

. From (6), this implies I Ih Mr h M   . Also, from Lemma 
2, 2h1Mh pˆpˆ   . Since [ h p !1 0( )  on (a,b), it follows that [ h M p !( ) 0  on (a,b). Thus, just as in 
Proposition 2, I h M  is strictly convex on [a,b]. Consequently, using 0)1/()1( JU , the mps 
for ph M+
*
 leads to . 
  Suppose now that p p
h k
r
h k+ +
<
$
 for , for some m satisfying . 
Then we want to show that p ph m
r
h m   1 1

. We know that p ph m
r
h m 
 , implying, (using (6) and 
0)1/()1( UJ ), that I Ih mr h mp p   !1 1( )  ( )  on [a,b]. Also, using Lemma 2, [ h p !1 0( )  on 
(a,b) implies [ h m p  !1 0( )  on (a,b). The now familiar argument then yields  ! #   	 strictly convex 
on [a,b]. It follows that 
 
(11)  , 
 
where p *  is the period-(h+m-1) price with the initial distribution and  is the post-mps 
period-(h+m-1) price. (The equality in (11) holds if there is no mps in period h+m-1.) Using the 
definition of  and the fact that 0)1/()1( <g-r- , one concludes that p p
h m
r
h m+ - + -
<
1 1
$
. 
Hence, by induction, p p
h k
r
h k+ +
<
$
 for k=1,…,M, and in particular, p p
h
r
h+ +
<
1 1
$
. 
 The prices for j=2,...,h remain iid with the initial distribution. (If h=1, skip this step in the 
proof.) Given this and p p
h
r
h+ +
<
1 1
$ , Lemma 1 implies that p p
j
r
j
<
$
 for j=2,...,h.  
 To summarize, for any j=2,...,h+M, p p
j
r
j
<
$
. Using (6) and ( 0)1/()1 <r-g- , it follows 
that for j=1,...,h+M-1,  on [a,b]. Finally, 1 0- <g  implies that for any such j, 
 for A>0 and . 
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 For the case of , the proof is strictly analogous to that for , the changes being 
that  is used, and that  for j=2,...,h+M. This completes the proof of the 
proposition.// 
 
 The discussion following Proposition 2, (as it relates to the second part of that 
proposition), carries over to Proposition 3. Part of the intuition that carries over takes the 
following form. If the consumer is worse off due to an increase in period-(h+1) price uncertainty 
(when there are N-h-1 periods left in her life), she will be worse off with an increase in price 
uncertainty after period h+1, when there are fewer periods left in her life for adjustment to the 
increased uncertainty. Therefore the combination of increases in price uncertainty at and after 
period h+1 should make the consumer worse off if the increase in price uncertainty in period h+1 
makes her worse off.  
 Symmetrically, if the consumer benefits from an increase in price uncertainty in period 
h+1, then she benefits from increases in price uncertainty in periods earlier than h+1, and from the 
combination of increases in price uncertainty in periods before and at period h+1. The counterpart 
of Proposition 3 is stated as follows with proof omitted.   
 
Proposition 4. Suppose that there is a set of independent mps’s, not necessarily the same, for 
two or more prices , where . Let h+1 denote the latest period in which there 
is an mps, where h takes some value in {2,...,N-1}. If  on (a,b),6 then for any  j=1,..,h, 
 for any A>0 and  (here,  is the initial, pre-mps value function 
and  the post-mps value function  for period j). That is, for any such j and corresponding 
realization , the consumer is better off. 
 
                                               
6
 In the statement of Proposition 4, we define , i.e. If h+1=N, we must assume J2. 
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 Following upon the result in Proposition 3, another question comes to mind. Suppose 
initially a single mps in period h+1, for some , and suppose that this makes the 
consumer worse off than she would have been, in any given period j = 1,...,h, for any given 
associated realization . That is, for any j= 1,...,h, and corresponding realization , 
 decreases. Is there a further decrease in these  when one or more mps’s 
are added for periods later than h+1? It turns out that the condition  on (a,b) is 
sufficient for an affirmative answer here. 
 
Proposition 5. Suppose that initially there is a single mps in period h+1, for some 
, and suppose that  on (a,b). Denote the resulting value functions 
, j=1,...,h . (From Proposition 2, we know that  for A>0 and .)  
Suppose that one or more further mps’s are added for periods h+i, for some values of 
. For the full configuration of mps’s, denote the resulting value functions . 
Then for j=1,...,h,  for A>0 and . 
 
Proof. As with the value functions in the statement of the proposition, denote values and functions 
resulting from the initial mps by a superscript “s” and those resulting from the full configuration of 
mps’s by a superscript “t”.  
 The first part of the proof is parallel to the first part of the proof for Proposition 3. The 
execution -- establishing that , (for ), and that , (for 
), but for k only running over 2,...,M -- is essentially unchanged and so is not repeated here. 
(The equalities , k=2,...,M, hold, because, as in Proposition 2, the (isolated) mps for 
 does not affect  for . However, again as in Proposition 2, .) Also, as 
for Proposition 3, the pattern of the proof for the case of  is strictly analogous to that for 
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, so we attend only to the latter case. Finally, we omit many details of implications that are 
analogous to those in the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3. 
 Thus, take . It follows that  on [a,b]. This 
implies that , where is the price in period h+1 after the initial 
mps. From this last inequality, we have  . This in turn implies that  on 
[a,b]. We then have  for A>0 and .  
 If h>1, consider periods j=1,...,h-1. Given that , Lemma 1 implies that 
 for any such j. Then as before,  on [a,b], implying that 
 for A>0 and .//  
 
 There are immediate corollaries to Propositions 3-5, analogues to the corollary to 
Proposition 2. (There is the obvious difference that these corollaries involve conditions (9) and 
(10) separately. Also, for Proposition 4, the indicated corollary holds only if the restriction h+1<N 
is added. See footnote 6.) The significance of these corollaries is the same as for the earlier one: 
conditions (9) and (10) are independent of the timing of the increase in uncertainty being 
considered. In the interest of brevity, we omit explicit presentation of these additional results. 
 
3.b. Infinite horizon  
 For the case of an infinite horizon, we denote the current period as period 1 with 
realization (A1,p1). Initially, the prices for all future periods are iid with distribution function F and 
support [a,b], just as for the N-period case. Additionally, as for the N-period case, independence 
and the support [a,b] are maintained when prices are not identically distributed. We introduce the 
subscript k = 1,2,... to index all periods.  
 The maximization here is strictly analogous to that for the N-period case. For the initial 
specification, we can drop the subscripts and obtain the resulting value function                              
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(12)       _____________________ 
                                           
 
             
             =   ___________________________________,  
                                                 
 
with  thus given by 
(13)       , where .  
 
It is also immediate to derive the analogue to (7). If future prices are not identically distributed, or 
generally if we want to distinguish among periods when considering value functions or other 
variables, then (5)-(7), with the corresponding definition of , apply. 
 Using a suitable limiting argument, we can show that there exists a continuous function  
defined on [a,b] satisfying (13). (It is clear from (13) that  is in fact differentiable in p.) From 
(13) we have .  
As there is no final period in the infinite-horizon case, we consider just the second and 
third types of increase in uncertainty distinguished in the finite-horizon case. That is, we consider 
the case in which an mps occurs in a single future period and the case in which (independent) 
mps’s occur in multiple future periods, finite in number.7  
 Suppose that there is an mps in some single period k+1, where . Consider the 
function  defined by 
(14)  . 
 The following proposition for a single mps and an infinite horizon is identical to 
Proposition 2 except that (14) replaces (8).   
                                               
7
 We conjecture that the restriction to a finite number of mps’s is not necessary but have not proved this result.  
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Proposition 6. If  on (a,b), then for any j = 1,...,k and corresponding realization 
,  increases. If  on (a,b), then for any  such j,  decreases. 
 
 The mps for  does not affect  and hence does not alter ;  defined 
above and  on [a,b], where  is defined in (13). As in the finite-horizon setting, 
the curvature properties of  are established using the sign of  on (a,b) and the size of . It 
is also immediate that Lemma 1 holds for j = 1,...,k. With these facts in hand, the proof of 
Proposition 6 is essentially identical to that for Proposition 2, and the intuitive discussion 
following Proposition 2, (except where that discussion inherently involves a finite number of 
periods), applies as well. Note that the function  is independent of the timing of the mps. 
 There is a corollary to Proposition 6 that is analogous to that to Proposition 2, the only 
change being that  replaces  (in condition (9)) and  (in condition (10)). Since  is 
already independent of the timing of the mps, the only force of the corollary is to replace the 
sufficient conditions in Proposition 6 by simpler conditions involving  the values a and b. 
 We now take the case of an increase in uncertainty represented by a set of two or more 
(but finite in number) mps’s in the context of an infinite horizon. For this case, in contrast to the 
finite horizon, we have results for increases and decreases in consumer well-being that involve the 
same timing of the mps’s. Formally, this is because there is no role in the current context for 
anything like Lemma 2. Intuitively, the consumer always has infinitely many periods remaining and 
the initial condition against which the impact of increased price uncertainty is assessed is the same 
in every period. Hence, beginning with increased price uncertainty in some period k that is 
beneficial to the consumer, the increased uncertainty in period k combined with increased 
uncertainty in either earlier periods or later periods will still benefit the consumer.      
 
 23 
Proposition 7.  Suppose that there is a finite set of independent mps’s, not necessarily the same, 
for two or more prices . Let h+1 denote the earliest period in which there is an mps, and 
h+M the last period in which there is an mps. Denote the post-mps value functions by . If 
 on (a,b), then for any j =1,...,h+M-1,  for A>0 and . If 
 on (a,b), then for any such j,  for A>0 and . 
 
Proof. For the case of  on (a,b), the proof is very similar to that for Proposition 3, the 
changes being that  everywhere replaces the  values and that in establishing , (for 
), and , (for ), no analogue to Lemma 2 is required. Hence, we omit the proof 
for this case. 
 The case of  on (a,b) has four subcases, (rather than the two for  on 
(a,b)), defined by >1 ( ) and >1 . The proofs for these subcases are strictly 
parallel, with the obvious subcase-specific modifications; and these proofs are also very much 
parallel to those for  on (a,b). So we restrict attention to  and , and provide 
merely a sketch of the proof. 
 Given the definition of M, . We then have , and we know that 
 is strictly concave on [a,b], so consequently .  
 An induction on the set K={1,...,M} now establishes that  for . The 
induction is analogous to that in the proof of Proposition 3, with (i)  replacing the various  
values, (ii)  replacing the functions , and with  strictly concave whereas the latter 
functions are strictly convex in Proposition 3, (iii) no use of a result such as Lemma 2, and (iv) 
reversal of inequalities where appropriate. 
 Focusing on the case of h>1, the prices for periods j=2,...,h remain iid with the initial 
distribution. It then follows from  that  for such j. Thus,  for j=2,...,h+M 
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and consequently, using ,  on [a,b] for j=1,...,h+M-1. Hence, using 
, for all of these h+M-1 periods,  for A>0 and .// 
 
 Finally, Proposition 8 below provides an answer to the symmetric version of the question 
addressed in Proposition 5: will a consumer, already made better off (worse off) due to a single 
mps in some period, be made still better off (still worse off) with the addition of further mps’s in 
later periods? Because the elements of the proof of Proposition 8 can be easily provided on the 
basis of the proof of Proposition 5 and that of Proposition 7, we state the proposition without 
proof. 
 
Proposition 8. Suppose that initially there is a single mps in period h+1, for some . 
Denote the resulting value functions by . Suppose that one or more, but a finite number, of 
further mps’s are added for periods h+i, with  taking values in some subset of {2,3,...}. For the 
full configuration of mps’s, denote the resulting value functions by . If  on (a,b), 
then for j=1,...,h,  for A>0 and . If  on (a,b), then the 
inequalities are reversed. 
 
4. Numerical Examples   
 In this section we present two numerical examples. The first involves a single mps, the 
second multiple mps’s. In these examples we find combinations of the parameters (J,U) for which 
mps’s in prices make the consumer worse off, using the condition that the function defined in (8), 
(in this section of the paper denoted simply ) is positive (Propositions 2 and 3).   
 For simplicity, in the examples, the initial and post-mps distributions are discrete, rather 
than continuous as assumed in the use made of  in the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3. In the 
numerical examples we have examined,  being positive on the relevant discrete set of prices 
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remains a sufficient condition for the consumer to be worse off. One can also think of 
approximating the discrete distributions arbitrarily closely with continuous distributions. 
 
Example 1. N=3, . The relevant support is {.98, 1, 1.02}. The initial distribution assigns 
probability one to . An mps is introduced in period 2 with probability of .5 
assigned to =.98 and to =1.02. 
 
Table 1: The combinations of parameters for which the mps in  makes the consumer worse off. 
 Consumer is worse off 
with the mps in  when 
>  
Consumer is worse off 
with the mps in  when 
<  
2.5 1.968 0.005 
5.5 0.247 0.009 
7.5 0.143 0.011 
  
The table shows that, for instance, with risk aversion coefficient  set at 2.5, the increase 
in uncertainty in the second period price makes the consumer worse off (in period 1) when the 
parameter is either larger than 1.968 (i.e., with elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) 
less than 0.508) or smaller than 0.005 (i.e., with EIS greater than 200).8  As the consumer 
becomes more risk averse (  increases), the two threshold values of the parameter  become 
closer to each other. Column two shows that the threshold value of decreases as  increases. 
An intuitive discussion related to this case was given following Proposition 2. In the present 
example . Hence by Proposition 2 and definition (8) of [ the increase in price uncertainty 
lowers consumer welfare if  is small enough or U( -2) is large enough. In the case at hand, 
                                               
8
 The threshold values for  are defined for  in both examples.  For each parameter pair, such as (2.5, 
1.968) in the first example, the value of  is positive for 0.98 and 1. 
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there is a tradeoff between  and U. As the consumer becomes more risk averse, she is more likely 
to be made worse off by the increase in price uncertainty unless she has a larger EIS (smaller ).  
 An interesting feature of Table 1 is that the threshold value of U is not necessarily 
decreasing in J and is not unique. The third column shows that when U is close to 0 (EIS is large), 
then for a given level of risk aversion the consumer is more likely to be worse off with the 
increase in price uncertainty when she has a larger EIS. As was discussed following Proposition 2, 
this counter-intuitive result is due to the fact that when , if her EIS is large the consumer 
chooses to consume most of her resources early in her life.  The "front-loading" consumption 
profile reduces the potential benefit of increased price uncertainty. For instance, consider the first 
row of Table 1 with =2.5. Our calculations show that when U=1.968 expected consumption in 
the last period of life is about 32.4% of the consumer’s lifetime resources; in contrast when 
U=0.005 expected consumption in the last period of life is less than of her lifetime resources. 
Because third period consumption is so low, even if  turns out to be low the consumer cannot 
take much advantage of the low price. As U gets smaller, consumption becomes more front-
loaded and the benefit of a potentially low price is further reduced. Given the degree of risk 
aversion the consumer becomes more likely to be worse off due to increased price uncertainty 
when her EIS is larger.  
 The third column also shows a positive relationship between  and the threshold value of 
U. When  becomes larger, the consumer leans toward less front-loading, and so, (connecting 
with the preceding argument), a given, large EIS contributes less to the likelihood that the 
consumer is made worse off by an increase in price uncertainty. Thus, the threshold value of the 
EIS is smaller (the value of  is larger).  
 It should be noted that our example shows that the EIS has to be very large for the 
unintuitive case to hold. The smallest EIS in the third column is about 100, which is much larger 
than what most empirical studies find.       
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Example 2. , the support, and the initial distribution are as in Example 1. The same mps as in 
Example 1 is introduced in every period j after the first period (j=2,3,..N). Several lengths of 
lifespan are considered: N=3,5,7,10. 
 
Table 2: The combinations of parameters for which the set of multiple mps’s makes the 
consumer worse off. 
 
 N=3, consumer is 
worse off if  
N=5, consumer is 
worse off if  
N=7, consumer is 
worse off if  
N=10, consumer is 
worse off if  
2.5 1.968 5.999 10.029 15.074 
5.5 .246 .754 1.274 2.069 
7.5 .142 .446 .748 
 
1.212 
 
 The second columns of Tables 1 and 2 both report the threshold values of U for given 
values of J; the former pertains to a single-period mps in second period price 2, the latter to mps's 
in both second and third period prices. The results are in accord with Proposition 5: if the 
consumer is made worse off by an mps in price in a single period k, then she is (even) worse off 
with the addition of mps’s for prices after period k. The results suggest that for small increases in 
price uncertainty the threshold values for the case of multiple mps’s are quite similar to those for a 
single mps.  Unlike the case studied in example 1 (where N=3), for the cases N=5,7, and 10, 
 is larger than 1, hence the "low-remaining-wealth" scenario does not appear and the 
threshold value of U is decreasing in J.  
 Table 2 provides a numerical assessment of the likelihood that an increase in price 
uncertainty reduces consumer welfare. For example, if N=7 (that is, there are six years left in the 
consumer's life) and if the risk aversion coefficient J is 2.5, then price uncertainty reduces 
consumer welfare if U is larger than 10.029 (or the EIS is less than 0.1). As just noted above, for a 
given N, the threshold value of  decreases as  increases. The intuition carries over from the 
single-mps case. As risk aversion increases, an increase in price uncertainty is more likely to make 
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the consumer worse off unless the consumer is more willing to substitute consumption 
intertemporally, (that is, unless the EIS is higher (  lower)).  
 Comparison of different columns of Table 2 shows that as N increases the threshold value 
of U increases for a given value of J. Intuitively: For a larger value of N there are more periods 
left after the realization of a given period’s price, for instance, the period 2 price. The agent has 
more time to respond to the observed price. For the consumer to be worse off given the level of 
risk aversion, the EIS must be lower (  must be larger).  
 
5. Empirical Literature on the Values of Parameters U and J 
The foregoing development focuses on the role of risk aversion, measured by the 
parameter , and intertemporal substitution, measured by the inverse of the structurally distinct 
parameter , in determining the impact of price uncertainty on consumer welfare. It is therefore 
of interest to briefly review the findings of the empirical literature regarding these parameters. 
Studies that focus on elements of asset return data find that  has to be large. The 
simulations by Kocherlakota (1990a), Cecchetti et al (1992), and Kandel and Stambaugh (1990), 
employing a standard expected-utility representation of preferences, conclude that  should be 
around 13.7, 29, and 55 respectively, in order to explain the observed equity premium. Weil 
(1989) derives asset-pricing implications of a model embodying the preference structure used in 
this paper. With  set at 0.95, he finds that to explain both the observed equity-premium and the 
risk-free rate in the U.S. economy the risk aversion coefficient J should be about 45 and the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1/U should be about 0.1 (i.e., U should be about 10).   
Estimation of the parameters  and  is a common exercise in the literature of 
consumption-based asset pricing theory. Much of the earlier empirical work involves tests of 
consumption-based asset-pricing models using the state-separable utility function, 
, with  serving the dual roles of coefficient of relative risk aversion and 
 29 
the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Estimation using the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) often produces low estimates for .  For example, Mankiw et al 
(1985) find  to be close to 0.3 and Hansen and Singleton (1982) find  to be close to 0.8.9 Hall 
(1988) argues that the estimated parameter, , of the state-separable utility function actually 
measures the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution . He concludes that empirical 
evidence supports the view that 1/  is quite small, (in the neighborhood of 0.1). Weil (1990) 
points out that, within the context of the preference structure of this paper, Hall's interpretation is 
valid if asset returns are lognormal. Kocherlakota (1990b) argues that consumption growth and 
asset returns cannot be jointly lognormal if consumer preferences have a non-expected utility 
representation. He argues that Hall’s estimated parameter  likely reflects risk aversion. Some 
recent studies employ preference structures that explicitly separate the parameters  and .  
Epstein and Zin (1991) find that 1/  is about 0.2 to 0.9 and  is close to 1. However, Jorion and 
Giovannini (1993) find that  and  cannot be precisely estimated. Their estimates of  and  
vary considerably, with estimates for  as large as 13, and estimates for  as large as 12, 
depending on whether the estimation method is maximum likelihood or GMM, and for the latter 
case, the instruments used for estimation. 10 
In summary, in this literature there is considerable disagreement regarding estimates of the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. What can be 
said, from the perspective of the current paper, is that many of the estimates are consistent with 
increases in intertemporal price uncertainty being welfare reducing. 
 
6. Conclusion 
                                               
9
 Dunn and Singleton (1986), Eichenbaum, Hansen, and Singleton (1988), Eichenbaum and Hansen (1990), and 
Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) show that the estimated EIS depends on, in addition to consumption of nondurables, 
whether and how consumption of leisure and durable goods are introduced into the utility function. 
10
 Some of Jorion and Giovannini's estimates for U and J are even negative.  
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 In this paper we examine how intertemporal price uncertainty affects consumer welfare. 
We employ a preference structure in which the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) are parametrically independent. This allows us to 
highlight the distinct roles they play in determining the impact of increased intertemporal price 
uncertainty on consumer welfare.  
  The coefficient of risk aversion ( ) being larger than 2 is a necessary condition for the 
consumer to suffer from increases in intertemporal price uncertainty. No comparable necessary 
condition exists for the EIS ( ). Given that  is greater than 2, for an arbitrary pair  and U, 
younger consumers are less likely to be worse off due to a given increase in price uncertainty than 
are older consumers. Under empirically plausible circumstances, for a given value of  if U is 
larger than a corresponding threshold value, then the consumer is worse off with an increase in 
price uncertainty. In other words, for a given degree of risk aversion, increased price uncertainty 
reduces consumer welfare if the EIS is sufficiently low. For higher  the threshold value of  is 
lower; if an increase in the degree of risk aversion is not offset by a large enough increase in the 
EIS, the consumer suffers from an increase in price uncertainty. However, if the EIS is very large, 
the relationship can change: as the degree of risk aversion increases, it is possible that an increase 
in the EIS makes it more likely that increased price uncertainty reduces consumer welfare.  
 As is indicated above, in the empirical literature the range of estimates for  and the EIS 
is broad. However, for much of this range, (specifically, moderate to large coefficient of risk 
aversion and small EIS), the results of this paper suggest that increases in intertemporal price 
uncertainty are likely to reduce the welfare of consumers. 
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